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South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s: as barricades
burned- in the townships, and armoured vehicles rolled through
their streets, whites poured endlessly into the shops and malls
in an apparent frenzy of consumption. At first glance this
picture provides a classic example for a Marcusian view of the
modern consumer; emotionally deadened by the blandishments of
mass culture, he or she becomes the apt subject of the
authoritarian state.
But in this article I will suggest that something more complex
that was happening. Ultimately, the shopping-obsessed hedonists
of the 1980s proved unwilling to fight to the death for their
racial privilege. This paper is part of an attempt to explain
why white South Africans, despite the continuing influence of
various forms of racial ideology, and despite their demonstrable
indifference to much of the suffering around them, did in fact
opt for change.1 And it seeks to do so in a way which links
the behaviours of daily life with national politics, rejecting
any simple distinction between micro- and macro- levels of social
analysis. Consumerism and acceptance of political change were
linked in complex ways. The new patterns of consumption, rather
than stabilising support for the racial order, were bound up with
new and more self-reflexive forms of self-identity which were not
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easily compatible with the state's abstract and unitary political
projects. The argument of the paper therefore parallels that of
recent sociologists of contemporary consumption who tend toward
a less pessimistic view of shopping's social impact3 than has
often been the case in the work of their predecessors.
The paper examines the world of consumption on the West Rand, an
area just outside Johannesburg, during the South African
democratic transition of 1985 to 1995. My route into this
question is through a series of interviews with small business
people.3 After outlining my overall argument, I will provide an
overview of the way in which political struggles interacted with
the world of retail and entrepreneurship. I will then proceed
to focus on the experiences of shopkeepers and business people,
showing how these illustrate my broader arguments.
Virtually all accounts of the South African transition would
agree that it was the product of revolt led by the ANC and
internal social movements, of external pressure in the form of
sanctions, and of the policy shift to negotiation by the
liberation movement under Mandela and the National Party (NP)
under FW De Klerk (though analysts may disagree about the
relative importance of each of these) .* But such macro-
political factors by themselves fail to explain why the large
majority of whites were prepared to acquiesce in change in the
end. Throughout the 1990s there were substantial forces in white
politics which did attempt to give leadership to white rejection
of change.1 PW Botha's 'successful' repression in the 1980s
demonstrated that the option of continued military control
existed, albeit at the price of a wider war and economic decline.
It was not inevitable that whites would do what the rest of the
world thought of as sensible and capitulate. To say that it was
in their interests to do so, begs the question of how they
conceived of their interests. There is thus a real question as
to why whites went along with political change.'
There was an important shift in the subjectivity of white South
Africans between the beginning of the 1970s and the beginning of
the 1990s which made it more difficult to mobilise them
effectively for the defence of the racial order. This new
subjectivity was related to the wider global changes in self-
identity associated with the era of late modernity.7 Forms of
identity emerged which focused on 'lifestyle1. New patterns of
consumption were a crucial driving force of this change. With
an increasing tendency of whites to identify as globalised
consumers, their ability to identify with the abstract cause of
apartheid declined. Their self-identification became
increasingly self-regarding and hedonistic.
This situation marked a change from the era of the 1960s when the
state had some success in a modernist project of tightly
regulating white society through surveillance of political,
social and sexual conduct, cultural autarky through censorship,
and military conscription. State initiatives helped to generate
a subjectivity which was amenable to the defence of the modernist
state project of a totalitarian racial order. In the next
decades this subjectivity was eroded.
Vital to this breakdown was the social division which occurred
in Afrikaner nationalism from around the end of the 1960s. In
the 1950s and 1960s the NP had succeeded in imposing on
Afrikaners a monolithic and almost hermetically sealed unity.
In this era the National Party constructed a network which I
refer to as the 'pseudo-traditional organisational complex'.*
The complex was a set of institutions aimed at keeping Afrikaners
mobilised and separate from English speaking whites' and foreign
cultural influences. Increasingly, this complex was cross cut
by tensions between the emerging middle class, professionals and
business leadership on the one hand, and lower grade white collar
employees, workers and agrarian nationalists on the other.
Generally, the former began to accept limited changes in the
structure of apartheid while the latter resisted them. But even
more important from our point of view here, these initially
relatively minor political differences fragmented the unity of
the NP. The result was a clear decline in the cohesiveness of
Afrikaner identity and in the mobilisational capacity of the
pseudo-traditional organisational complex.10 Especially the more
affluent strata began looking outward, which enabled an
interaction between the new global processes of subjectivity
formation and local ones. A 'strong' Afrikaner identity
combining allegiance to volk and state was increasingly replaced
by a 'residual' Afrikaner identity, comprising an emotional
attachment to language and informal social and business networks.
The rise of a consumerist identity did not of course mean that
whites were automatically going to become more racially
egalitarian." But a strongly individualised sense of self-
interest was likely to come into play in making political
decisions. Therefore, when in the 1980s political pressures on
white South Africa became severe, the priority for large swathes
of that society was not the pursuit of racial ideology, but the
possibility of continuing to pursue 'lifestyle'. This outlook
was not conducive to military sacrifice, and encouraged
calculations about accepting a new order in which property rights
would be guaranteed.
The need to change propelled whites into constructing new
narratives of the self. This self was characteristically defined
in terms of a certain style of consumption, which people of
varying socio-economic positions would label as 'middle class'.
A notion of 'middle class-ness' was deployed by people brought
up within the confines of racial ideology to negotiate the road
to desegregation. Racial boundaries began to blur, and
commitment to racial ideologies weakened." The typical pattern
which emerged in my interviews was one of claims to have never
been personally racist in the past, combined with a declared
willingness to accept integration with the black 'middle class1 .
The focus of social fear shifted from race as such to questions
of social stratification. The more affluent or more change-
minded strata of whites wanted desegregation to be managed in a
way that would unify the 'middle class' across racial boundaries
while preventing the black poor from entering formerly 'white'
schools and housing areas in large numbers.
Globalised media played an enormous role in the process of white
self-identification. There was in the re-narrativization of self
that whites embarked on, a strong sense of talking outward,
addressing a global audience whose criticisms of them even the
state broadcaster had been unable to suppress. The notion of
'middle class-ness1 drew on television images of American
suburbia and consumer styles. Desegregation was imagined through
television treatments of it.
The importance of the shopping and entertainment in white daily
life became enormous. It was in this sphere that white society
was increasingly invested. Defence of 'lifestyle' came to be
seen as separable from defence of the racial order, and more
important than it.
Shopping in Revolutionary Krugersdorp
To the East and West of Johannesburg, a continuous strip of
industrial towns follows the Reef, the accessible strip of gold
bearing ore near the surface. This is 'The Rand1. The mines
around which these towns were originally constructed at the end
of the nineteenth century are in decline, and the industries
which have built around them struggle to survive globalised
competition. During the 1980s and 1990s the West Rand was at
the centre of the battle for the future of South Africa." The
divisions of the society were built into its physical structure
in remarkably clear way. Spinal roads linked a chain of town
centres, designated as 'white' areas under apartheid. Moving
west, Roodepoort is the nearest to Johannesburg; then comes
Krugersdorp, and then Randfontien. Roodepoort was by far the
most modern and prosperous of these towns; it had extensive new
cluster housing developments and prosperous suburbs. There were
some important social disparities within the formerly 'white'
towns. Some parts of Roodepoort, and to a much greater extent
Krugersdorp and Randfontein, were marked by the presence of
visible 'poor white' areas. Krugersdorp has a clear physical
division between affluent Noordheuwel and working class West
Krugersdorp, the latter characterised by grim face brick housing
and evident unemployment.
But far greater disparities were to be found in contrasting the
central towns with the string of African townships which
apartheid planning generated as a separate chain of housing
beyond the white suburbs. These were overcrowded and lacking in
basic facilities. For the purposes of this paper, the most
important of them was Kagiso, south of Krugersdorp and the home
of much of its workforce. By the late 1980s the combination of
township housing shortages and declining enforcement of apartheid
had enabled homeless people to establish squatter camps in some
of the empty peripheral spaces around the white suburbs.
Inside this configuration there was a specific shape to the world
of retailing. The old urban centres in Krugersdorp, and several
parts of Roodepoort, had the clusters of chain stores, small
general stores, hardware shops, and green grocers characteristic
of small South African towns. Many of the successful businesses
were operated by individuals from specific ethnic backgrounds;
Indians (mainly Moslems descended from Gujerati-speaking
immigrants), Greeks, Portuguese and some Italians. Historically,
the Jewish community had played a large part in retail in the
town, but this role had declined because of upward social
mobility and movement out of the area. As we shall see, the
contribution of Afrikaners and the generality of white English
speakers to entrepreneurship in the area was much more patchy
than those of the smaller ethnic minorities.
The pattern of localised shopping had been disrupted, although
not totally displaced in the 1980s, with the construction of
Westgate, a vast, post-modern shopping mall on the Roodepoort
boundary with Krugersdorp. The mall transformed consumption
patterns in the area, drawing shoppers on a big scale from the
white towns and increasingly, the black townships of the whole
West Rand. It presented shoppers with a panoply of consumption
opportunities, in contrast to the rather basic range of goods in
the Krugersdorp shops. There were lavishly stocked prestige
stores, speciality shops, cinemas, restaurants, and fast food
outlets. The challenge of Westgate put the smaller businesses
of the area under pressure and those which survived tended to be
the ones able to offer extra services, convenience, good pricing
or exceptional quality. Often these survivors were again,
businesses run by minorities with considerable accumulated
business experience.
Indian traders had been formally excluded from the central
business area of Krugersdorp at the height of apartheid, but some
had found legal expedients to get around this restriction. With
the crumbling of much 'petty' apartheid legislation in the 1980s
they were able to regularise their position. But few African
entrepreneurs could break into the trade of the town centre,
because of both the lack of capital and connections, and the
racist atmosphere of the town. Township business centred on
small shops and street trading. The conservative Krugersdorp
council strove to keep a rising tide of street traders out of the
town centre, but by the early 1990s, this was a lost battle. The
most visible sign of African entrepreneurship in the centre was
the minibus taxi industry, which by the 1990s was burgeoning and
generating considerable returns. The difference in the spatial
situation of black and white business was to have important
consequences.
In the latter half of 1985, township organisations launched
boycotts of shops. This was part of the quasi-revolutionary
uprising which swept through the Southern Transvaal, involving
extensive street clashes between youths and security forces. The
aim of the boycotts was put economic pressure on the national and
local state, in pursuance of a wide variety of political and
economic demands. In Krugersdorp youth organisations made
agreements with African retailers and taxi owners that they would
be exempt from the boycott in exchange for lowered prices. These
events commenced a series of boycotts which flared up at moments
of local or national crisis, over the next ten years. Tensions
were exacerbated when the National Party lost control of
Krugersdorp municipal council to the extreme right in 1988.
Although, within a year, the dominant faction on the council
backed down from its attempts to maintain a fully segregationist
policy, its behaviour certainly exacerbated local aspects of the
conflict.
This situation created a complex set of tensions. African
retailers had an interest in maintaining boycotts of all other
businesses, but not in accepting price reductions. White
entrepreneurs for the most part suffered serious declines in
takings during the boycotts. They saw the hard line reactionary
Krugersdorp council as a key problem. Almost unanimously, whites
in small business fulminated against the role of the council.
Even before the extreme rightist take over, the council's
ineptitude had lost the town the chance to have Westgate built
within its boundaries. They council had also, their critics
claimed, lost opportunities for the establishment of a car
factory, a minor airport and a university campus in the town.
By the early 1990s, white business people in Krugersdorp were
desperate to cut a deal with black political organisations, to
prevent the destruction of the local economy by boycott.
The Indian business community were in an important, though
uncomfortable, hinge situation in this conflict. The ANC had a
political project of creating African and Indian unity. Moreover
as the transition picked up speed in the 1990s, established
Indian business people were often well placed to manoeuvre white
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business into the kinds of alliances which the ANC wished to
create. The record of Moslem participation in ANC politics gave
some Indian business people credibility with African
organisations, while their significant local economic status gave
them credibility with white business. Yet the interests of
African and Indian entrepreneurs could be, and often were,
defined as clashing with one another.
In 1986 a local African business body was formed, the Kagiso
African Chamber of Commerce (KAFCOC). Many Indian businessmen
joined it, on the basis of an agreement that there would be
cooperation between African business organisations and the Indian
community. When the transition opened in the early 1990s, a
boycott broke out over charges for services in the townships.
Despite the Indian businesses support for KAFCOC, KAFCOCs
leaders did not consult them and included Indian shops in the
businesses to be boycotted. This outbreak of tension between
African and Indian business interests was only overcome after the
Indian community provided shelter for refugees fleeing a Zulu
nationalist attack on ANC supporters at the Swannieville squatter
camp. Following the positive response in the townships to this
action, Indian businesses were exempted from the boycott. A
subsequent boycott in response to the 1993 assassination of
Communist Party leader Chris Hani was much better managed. A
high level ANC delegation held talks with the various
organisations, creating a front embracing both Indian and African
businesses. The prospect of being exempted from the boycott on
an individual basis was held out to white businesses on condition
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they aligned themselves with the democratic movement. Eventually
most white business came into an agreement to pressure the
council for change. The ANC thus effectively managed to draw
most of local business into an alliance by the time of the 1994
election.
The political pressures to which Krugersdorp whites were
subjected were crucial in bringing about change. But as I argued
above, these pressures do not in themselves fully account for why
change rather than repression was accepted as the option.
Krugersdorp was after all a town in which right wing
organisations were very active in proposing repressive political
•solutions'. The willingness of the town's white businesses, and
eventually, of most of its white voters to accept participation
in the new system needs to be accounted for. The forces
symbolised by Westgate - the spread of a new kind of consumerist
identity - were crucial in eroding the very clear boundaries of
racial and ethnic identity which had hitherto prevailed amongst
whites on the West Rand, creating the subjective basis for a
political shift. The individual case studies which follow aim
to provide some insights into how this process played out in the
world of the small businessperson and the white consumer.
Dave: The Incompetence of Whiteness
Extraordinary attitudinal problems amongst white small business
owners were identified by Dave, an expert on small business
development who was associated with the Roodepoort chamber of
Commerce. Dave argued that entrepreneurs were chronically unable
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to take a long-term view of their situation:
"So many entrepreneurs say to me that the only thing they
believe in is, that in a business you've got to make money.
And in that process all they do is to chase turnover, and
they spend so much bloody time chasing turnover that at the
end of the line, behind them the walls are falling down".
Dave had found that many entrepreneurs were unable to present
adequate business plans, monitor their cash flows or plan
financially.
What emerges from Dave's characterisation of the entrepreneurs
is how far they were driven by a self-identity as consumers
rather than by seeing themselves as producers or creators.
Business was conceived of by many entrepreneurs as subsidising
their hedonistic life styles rather than as being an activity of
any intrinsic worth. Business owners failed to appreciate the
necessity for hands-on management. Dave had found that owners
were frequently absent from their businesses:
"It's golf on Mondays, Tuesday golf, Wednesday lunch and
golf, on Thursday it's only golf in the afternoon, Friday
it's probably golf all day and who the hell does any
business on Saturday anyway? People are simply not in their
businesses".
Initial success was often spoiled by entrepreneurs who were
splashed out on things that they couldn't afford, notably luxury
cars. In Dave's view a typical pattern would be that after a
successful first 18 months, the owner would let down his guard,
and the business would then lose direction and collapse.
Dave's account evokes very well the consumption oriented ethos
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of the white middle class. This desire for instant gratification
may have been further encouraged by the short term personal
horizons that the background of chronic political instability
fostered. Amongst many whites, there was an expectation of high
rewards for limited effort.
Karen: Ambiguities of New South Africanism
Karen is representative of the more successful end of the
spectrum of small Afrikaner entrepreneurs and of the more
reformist trends within Afrikaner self-identity. She and her
husband Jan, a Netherlander, had run a bakery in Krugersdorp for
18 years (with one interval). The longevity and success of the
business was based on its convenient suburban location and the
good quality of its products. By buying there, suburbanites
could save themselves a trip to Westgate. The chain stores could
not compete on quality. Karen and Jan had been alarmed when a
supermarket had opened a bakery section, selling at lower prices,
but Karen and Jan's sales had not fallen off because the marked
superiority of their products gave them a niche in the market
place. The small African workforce was bound to the couple by
close paternalist relations. Two of their employees had been on
the staff since the first year of the shop's operation. No
employee had ever gone on strike or participated in a strike,
Karen claimed. To get around work boycotts in the townships,
they had independently made arrangements with Karen's domestic
employee to share her accommodation, so as to be able to avoid
having to pass pickets. An odd unintended consequence of the
boycotts had actually been to boost Karen's business. Because
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of the position of the shop in the suburbs, it was not monitored
by boycott supporters as shops in the town centre tended to be.
As a result many black shoppers who feared to be seen shopping
would go to Karen for their bread at such times.
Karen's religious history exemplified the loosening of the grip
of the pseudo-traditional organisations over daily life. She had
been raised at the centre of the complex, in the Dutch Reformed
Church. Jan was Catholic, and when their son was born, Karen's
DRC minister had given Jan 'hassles' over the child's religious
future. This led Karen to decide to convert to Catholicism. She
and her husband had to be married again under the Catholic rite,
their children had to be re-baptised, and Karen had to be
confirmed again. After eight years in the Catholic church, Karen
and her children rejoined the DRC, but her daughter then moved
to a Methodist congregation. While this suggests the continued
pull on Karen's allegiances to the DRC, her attitude to the
church was a disillusioned one: "I still don't mind going to the
Dutch Reformed Church. I just feel that here where we are it is
very stodgy." She preferred to attend a DRC congregation in
another area which had relaxed 'carefree' attitude and was
influenced by charismatic ideas: "to me they're not Dutch
Reformed any more. They've totally changed." In this way Karen
was typical of the loss of faith in the pseudo-traditional
organisations. Similarly, her children had become disaffected
from the Voortrekkers, the Afrikaner youth organisation: ".. .they
didn't enjoy it. It was too Afrikaans for them. Because I have
very liberal children and they don't fit in with the AWB {i.e.
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neo-fascists}."
Karen defined herself as a 'liberal'. What she appeared to mean
by this was that she was sceptical of the prevailing political
and racial ideologies within the Afrikaans speaking community,
and in favour of deracialization of institutions. She claimed
never to have voted before the 1994 election because of her
political disaffection. However, she also had reservations over
the pace of change. And in fact when the transition occurred,
she had opted for the party which seemed most able to exercise
white control over the speed of it, voting for FW De Klerk's NP:
"I desperately wanted a change, but I also felt that it
couldn't happen overnight...
...deep inside you were scared, scared of what would happen
when the change came..."
Karen's attitudes to desegregation were fairly typical of those
of the 'liberal' end of the white middle class. She had no
objection to integration, but wanted middle class white schools
to remain middle class. Thus racial integration had to be
introduced gradually from primary school, because, she claimed,
only in this way could 'standards' be maintained.
Karen was highly judgemental of the overt racism of poor whites,
but also herself fearful of black people as a collectivity. Her
son Stefan went to a predominantly white working class technical
school. She portrayed her son as the product of an uplifting
middle class background, distinguished from his racist
proletarian school fellows by both his liberal attitudes. The
kids at Jim Fouche Technical School Karen said would:
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"... kill a black if a black was taken in there. But most
of the kids are from Krugersdorp West... Stefan has never
mixed with those kids. He says you walk, you keep your eyes
front, that's it."
Stefan's 'one or two' friends were from middle class Noordheuwel.
Like many liberal Afrikaans speakers, Karen, while having
distanced herself from the pseudo-traditional complex of
Afrikaner organization, had in the post-election period
experienced a revival of ethno-linguistic identification
triggered by the state broadcaster's reduction of its Afrikaans
transmissions. This was widely seen by people like Karen as an
attack on their language, and a breach of the reciprocity
inherent in the transitional arrangements:
"... with television, they are wanting to take Afrikaans
off, you know going for Afrikaans and that kind of thing.
I never realised it would worry me and it does. It worries
me in the way that I realize it's a heritage I have ... I
haven't been a staunch Afrikaner but it has been there...
It's not politics, it's an identity, which to me is part of
my family ..."
Karen's career demonstrates the emergence of a sector of small
business targeted at the newly expanded white middle class. It
was, because of its small size and suburban location, relatively
insulated from surrounding political turmoil. An interesting
paradox is that Jan and Karen are able to import a labour
relations system arising from colonial paternalism into a
somewhat late modern business organisation. Karen's positions
were almost paradigmatic of those of liberal or reformist
Afrikaners interviewed in this study. Karen's self-identity is
based on globalised discourses of consumption, codified in terms
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of middle class-ness. This strong middle class identity enabled
Karen to embrace the idea of a desegregated South African middle
class. She was happy to embrace this notion as the price of
keeping the masses at bay. Karen had no sense of obligation to
poorer whites and was keen to distance herself from them in order
to strengthen her middle class status. Her rejection of
established notions of Afrikaner identity and her disenchantment
with the world of pseudo-traditional organisations was made very
clear.
It is interesting that it was the question of Afrikaans on
television which precipitated Karen's 'residual' sense of
Afrikaner identity. Her ideological world was rooted in
globalised media representations, but she wanted some
representation of her ethnicity within that framework.
George: Diasporic Businessman On the Front Line
George, a third generation South African of Greek descent, was
the owner-manager of one of Krugersdorp' s best known restaurants.
When interviewed in 1995, George was positive about political
change but at the same time felt squeezed between the resentment
he had experienced in the past from Afrikaners and what he
regarded as growing black antagonism to his community. Speaking
of the response his immigrant grandparents had experienced from
Afrikaners he said:
"And of course hulle was flip; donderse uitlanders [they were
the damn foreigners], And that filtered right through to the
third generation..."
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George continued to experience occasional incidents of this sort:
"I've been told that the 'Grieke is net wit kaffers' [Greeks
are just white kaffirs] by ...a drunk white Afrikaans
customer. Of course he just got kicked out ... you do get
. . . the owner of the restaurant being called Griekie [little
Greek] and that kind of thing, which does irritate one, but
for business1 sake I think one just swallows it ... there
is a certain amount of a condescending attitude."
Now it was violent robberies in shops, which George saw in racial
terms, which were making Greek shop owners anxious about their
future. He felt that the Greek community was particularly
exposed to criminal violence because of their high concentration
in vulnerable small businesses:
" We are shop kind of people, we are in cash businesses ...
people don't realise how worried we are about it.
We've seen not one, not two, but in the thirties and forties
of different incidents of young kids getting gunned down
when they close their Steers {steak houses}."
In addition he feared the anti-Greek sentiments expressed during
a recent strike against the SPAR chain of stores. A number of
SPAR franchise holders were of Greek origin, and the strike had
taken a xenophobic turn which included the trashing by strikers
of the Greek consulate: "For some obscure reason there are
banners saying 'Go Back to Greece ...'".
George had both benefitted from, and helped to create more
complex patterns of consumption amongst the Afrikaner middle
class of the area. Under its previous owner, the restaurant
which he ran had been only one of a handful of major restaurants
on the West Rand. When Westgate had opened up, featuring about
fifteen restaurants and entertainment venues, the restaurant,
then a steak house, had been badly hit by the competition and
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George had bought it. George developed the business as a
speciality Greek restaurant. Initially there had been a certain
amount of consumer resistance:
"I can't say it was a booming business from day one, purely
because people were sceptical, there's 'n Griekse soort kos
[a Greek kind of food] and 'n Griekse soort [a Greek kind
of] attitude and I think that it phased people slightly."
But George had in fact hit the consumer market at exactly the
point at which its tastes were changing:
"I've had the most incredible response from the Afrikaans
people in Krugersdorp. It's something new, it's something
different, and they're quite open and receptive to a new way
of looking at things, which I'm very, very impressed with."
It is interesting here that George's language starts to slide
away from the culinary and toward the political. For in fact the
'openness' and receptivity to 'a new way of looking at things'
which apparently characterised the political transition was
precisely bound up with the movement of the Afrikaner middle
class away from the world of pseudo-traditional ism and into a
self-identification as part of a world of globalised consumers.
The desire to participate in global patterns of consumption was
conducive to a greater degree of political adaptability. In the
restaurant the process of changing consumption and the rise of
class based desegregationism had run alongside one another.
Explaining how customers had accepted the racial desegregation
of his restaurant, George attributed this to class factors: "It
also reflects on the kind of clientele that I have. I don't know
how it would go down at your local franchised steak house."
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Nevertheless, the response from George to the difficulties of the
outside world had been withdrawal into the Greek community:
"We have one of the most successful Greek communities in
South Africa, in terms of what we offer to our members, in
terms of our growth. We have a full Greek school, primary
and high school... The community here is centred around the
church, purely because we are the only Greek church on the
West Rand. [And] because of the past hostility of other
whites..."
Yet the process of self-definition was complex, for the Greek
community in South Africa had a specific historical experience.
As George discussed this with his friend Nicos, the question
became ever more tangled:
Nicos: "The South African Greek is extremely, extremely
loyal to this country. And I don't know of many Greeks that
have said they want to leave the country. They feel they
must leave the country, sure, but they have got a really,
really strong allegiance to this country, because its given
them what they have."
George: "Also, our generation of people, we're South
Africans, we are not Greek. You know we go to Greece, and
we love it but we're ... {trails off} we're different."
Nicos: "But you're not accepted here as a South African,
by any means."
George: "You're basically an immigrant everywhere."
Nicos: "You're not a Greek over there either, but I do
believe they'll accept you because you are a Greek in
essence. No here, you are not a South African ... you are
not allowed to be one."
The long-term success of George's business indicates the
increasingly complex consumer demands of the Afrikaans speaking
middle strata. As his story suggests those strata became more
flexible on the political front, not so much as a straightforward
response to pressure, but as part of a strategy in which
participation in the patterns of late modern consumption came to
override every other consideration.
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As part of a diasporic minority within the dominant white
'racial' group, George found himself in a complex situation.
Long standing commercial skills inside his community could be
turned into very effective economic interventions. But his very
success put him in the social crossfire. Afrikaner hostility had
kept him socially marginalised in the past, although it was now
diminishing. Spiralling crime and unresolved racial antagonisms
made George fear for his future. As a consequence, he located
himself very firmly within the Greek community and was
contemplating emigration. Yet his social marginalisation was far
from total, and thus he was posed with problems as to how far his
identity was South African.
End of the Rainbow?
To what extent had the commercial world of Krugersdorp changed?
Ebrahim, a successful local Indian businessman who had been
active in pro-ANC political organisations, was very optimistic
about developments within white Krugersdorp:
"The real Evil-Kinevils (sic) were a small percentage. I'm
still convinced that the majority of Afrikaners have thrown
in the towel and accepted that they must live with the
people. Because you can see that there is a changing
attitude in Krugersdorp. . . Krugersdorp was very racialistic.
Today it is not."
Ebrahim thought that white support for such a shift was strong,
although it was stronger amongst the young than the old, and
stronger amongst the middle class than the working class. He
even felt the local police had shown they were willing to
confront right wingers.
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Karen was far more pessimistic. Although genuinely pleased, about
political change, she saw race relations in Krugersdorp as worse
than before and deteriorating. She thought that the right
wingers, whom she identified with the white working class of
Krugersdorp West, were more cautious than before the 1994
elections but more enraged beneath the surface:
"I think they might think before they do anything where
before they may just have acted ... But I actually think
there's more hatred, which I never would have believed
possible."
The picture is clearly a mixed one. There does seem to have been
a reduction in street level racist incidents in Krugersdorp. At
the same time Ebrahim's status as a respected businessmein does
means that he experiences the town in a different way than do the
African poor. Karen's conclusions are also a little problematic.
There was a broad relation between white right wing support and
lower incomes, but not a perfect one: there were wealthy right
wingers, and their were white low income earners who were
genuinely trying to come to terms with the new social order. And
even if whites' retreat from overt confrontation was as unwilling
as Karen suggests, it would have still made some practical
difference to daily life.
Political resistance and pressure provided the motive force for
whites to reassess their future. But the decisions they took in
response to those pressures were rooted in shifts in
subjectivity. And these shifts were not a purely local
phenomenon, but need to be understood in terms of the relation
between South Africa and the wider world of late modernity.
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categories in this paper. Use of these categories by the author
reflects that under apartheid, legal definitions of race -
•White', 'Coloured', 'Indian', 'African1, etc., had a reality
derived from the very different access to resources which people
in each of these categories possessed, the different levels of
coercion to which they were subjected, the forms of spatial
segregation which were imposed on them, and the significantly
differentiated forms of political organisation which consequently
emerged amongst them. But the categories were of course
thoroughly artificial. It took immense ideological and
bureaucratic labours for instance, for one part of the population
to be defined as 'white'. One of the paper's underlying
assumptions is that racial categories are subject to constant
disintegration and attempts at recomposition.
2. For example, Robert Bocock, Consumption (London, Routledge,
1993) .
3. The interviews quoted in this paper were carried out by
Candice Harrison in Roodepoort and Krugersdorp, between 1993 and
1995. The comments by 'Dave' were recorded by the author at a
Roodepoort Chamber of Commerce public seminar in 1993.
4. The best narrative of the transition is Patti Waldmeier,
Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the
New South Africa (London, Viking, 1997) . The best account of the
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Party 1948-1994 (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1996).
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Transition?" in P.F. Alexander, R. Hutchison and D. Schreuder
(eds.), Africa Today: A Multidisciplinary Snapshot of the
Continent in 1995 (Canberra, Australian National University,
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proposition implausible; by 1994 whites were probably more spread
out along an ideological and organisational spectrum than at any
time in the country's history.
7. The argument of the paper has been stimulated by the thinking
represented in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash,
Reflexive Modernization: Politics. Tradition and Aesthetics in
the Modern Social Order (Cambridge, Polity, 1995), and Martin
Albrow, The Global Age (Cambridge, Polity, 1996).
8. For the historical background see; T. Dunbar Moodie, The Rise
of Afrikanerdom: Power. Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil
Religion (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975) and Dan
24
O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme: Class. Capital and Jdeoloqy in the
Development of Afrikaner Nationalism. 1914-1948 (Johannesburg,
Ravan, 1993).
9. The most innovative reflections on Anglo-Afrikaner relations
are to be found in Donald Harman Akenson, God's Peoples:
Covenant and Land in South Africa. Israel and Ulster (Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1992).
10. The importance of class factors in the internal divisions of
Afrikanerdom is disputed by Hermann Giliomee, "The National
Party's Campaign for a Liberation Election" in A. Reynolds (ed.)
Election '94 South Africa: The Campaigns. Results and Future
Prospects (Cape Town, David Philip), p.46, and by Johan van
Rooyen, Hard Right: The New White Power in South Africa (London,
Tauris , 1994). However, a powerful case for the significance
of class divisions is made by O'Meara, Forty Lost Years. Class
divergences in Afrikaner politics are also emphasised by Heribert
Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind:
Options for the New South Africa (Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1993), p.150, by Timothy D. Sisk,
Democratisation in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995), pp.131-2 and by
Waldmeier, Anatomy. p.199. An extensive 1990 survey of
Bloemfontein white voters showed a remarkably tight correlation
between social class and political position: Lucius J.S. Botes,
Dirk C. Groenewald, Andre Pelser, "Aspekte van 'n Post-Apartheid
Suid Afrika Uit Die Oogtepunt Van Blanke Bloemfonteiners"
Joernaal vir Eietydse Geskiedenis. Dec. 1991, pp.54-75.
11. Vincent Crapanzano, Waiting: The Whites of South Africa (New
York, Random House, 1985), did a superb job of identifying the
forces of stasis in white subjectivity, but failed to identify
the factors making for their incipient erosion.
12. In contrast to my argument, Gerhart Schutte, What Racists
Believe (Sage, Thousand Oaks, 1995), contends that during the
transition whites in fact unified around a common racist
ideology, which apparent political differences only appeared to
cover. Schutte would surely be hard put to explain why
ideological divergences and conflicts amongst whites, up to and
including the point of killing each other, were so intense. And
indeed, can his argument explain why there was a transition at
all? If whites were so unified around the question of racial
domination, why were they not able to develop an effective
strategy to retain political power?
13. For an overview of the political conflicts in Krugersdorp in
the period see Jonathan Hyslop, "Problems of Explanation in the
Study of Afrikaner Nationalism: A Case Study of the West Rand",
Journal of Southern African Studies, vol.22, no.3, September
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